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Abstract
The Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and The Sarbanes
Oxley (SOX) regulations greatly influenced the health care industry regarding the means
of securing financial and private data within information and technology. With the
introduction of thinclient technologies into medical information systems (IS), data
security and regulation compliancy becomes more problematic due to the exposure to the
World Wide Web (WWW) and malicious activity. This author explores the best practices
of the medical industry and information technology industry for securing electronic data
within the thinclient environment at the three levels of architecture: the SQL database,
its middleware application, and Web interface.
Designing security within the SQL database is not good enough as breaches can
occur through unintended consequences during data access within the middleware
application design and data exchange design over computer networks. For example, a
“hospital’s medical records, which are routinely exchanged over computer networks, are
subject to the audit control an encryption requirements mandated for data security.”
(Department of, 2008).
While there is an overlapping of security techniques within each of the three
layers of architectural security design, the use of 18 methodologies greatly enhances the
ability to protect electronic information. Due to the variety of IS used within a medical
facility, security conscientiousness, consistency of security design, excellent
communication between designers, developers and system engineers, and the use of
standardized security techniques within each of the three layers of architecture are
required.
ii
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Executive Summary
According to A Guide to the SarbanesOxley Act (2002) and the Consumer Bill
of Rights and Responsibilities (2001), the implementation of laws in the United States
(U.S.), such as SarbanesOxley (SOX) and Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) has placed a burden on the medical industry to assure
information privacy. This is an exploration of the methodologies for securing patients’
personal, financial and confidential information contained within a medical SQL
database, and securing its middleware application within thinclient environments by
conducting interviews with Information Systems (IS) specialists within the medical
community, and by evaluating IS documentation pertaining both directly and indirectly to
the medical industry.
This document is written with a qualitative approach using grounded theory
obtained from various resources including: documentation and information provided
from IS specialists within the medical community, Oracle, International Business
Machines (IBM), Institute of Electrical Electronic Engineers (IEEE), International
Organizations for Standardization (ISO), National Institute of Standards (NIS),
Association for Information Standards (AIS) and publications on technology security
solutions. Other resources include medical organizations such as the Electronic Delivery
of Information in Healthcare, medical journals such as the Health Industry Insights, and
government agencies such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
This study provides an indepth overview of database security design and its
application security design and Web implementation design requirements. This study is
relevant to readers who are responsible for implementing and maintaining security in
1
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thinclient environments within not only the medical field, but also, more broadly across
the Information Technology (IT) sector. The information provided is from
standardization entities, and medical IT publications that compare and analyze the
security designs of various medical SQL database and middleware applications within
thinclient environments.
Due to a high variety of marketed security offerings by SQL database vendors,
application providers, and thinclient providers, the issues involved in securing a medical
database and its corresponding applications within a thinclient environment can vary
significantly depending on the specific IS implemented (Bunker, 2007). As a result, no
single security solution sufficiently meets every environment’s requirements (Bunker,
2007). The purpose of this investigation is not to dictate what should be done, but rather
to offer various solutions and methodologies at each level of architecture by focusing on
three specific areas of concern: databasedesign specific security, database middleware
design interface security and database/middlewareWeb Server interface security design.

2
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
The rules and regulations set forth by the SarbanesOxley (SOX) and Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has placed a burden on the
medical industry to assure information privacy. From 1998 through 2001, those in the
medical industry struggled with interpreting the laws and setting into place the data
security that was necessary to meet their interpretation of the laws. The medical industry
as well as many industries that were required to meet these laws did not have historical
information which to build data security (History, Overview, 2008). Thus, many unique
security solutions developed that gradually have in some part, become standardized
(Bunker, 2007). With the introduction of thinclient technology, complex solutions are
required. Information technology personnel have concerns regarding how to insure SOX
and HIPAA security compliance between SQL databases, their ntier applications, and
Web interfaces. (Singhal, 2007)
.
1.1 – SOX Compliance
In Section 302 of the SOX Act (i.e. Appendix A), periodic statutory financial
reports are to include certification of the following:
1. The signing officers are responsible for the internal controls and have evaluated
these internal controls, within the previous ninety days, and have reported on their
findings.
2. A required list of all deficiencies in the internal controls and information on any
fraud that involves employees, who are involved with internal activities, is
included with the financial statements.

3
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3. Any significant changes in internal controls or related factors that could have a
negative impact on the internal controls are included with the financial statements
(A Guide To, 2002).
For the medical industry, these laws pertain to the organizations internal financial
records including patient financial records and insurance carriers. A simple record within
an SQL table of a medical billing database may contain data fields that require:
1. Limited or no access by certain personnel for viewing data records, which would
require an “As needs to know.” role within the organization.
2. Limited or no access by organization outsiders but related parties, such as:
insurance providers, medical researchers and clinical trials personnel.
3.

Access monitoring by activity log files noting users who have accessed a record,
the date and time of access and changes made.

4. Audit table updates for each record when view, edits and updates occur, noting
the user, the date and time the record was accessed
Table 1 reflects the role relationships in a simple SQL database table that you will
note adds complexity to a secure database design. While there is some cross over
between the SOX and HIPAA laws it is important to know that SOX is a regulation
concerning internal financial reporting, presentation, and security while HIPAA is
more representative of an individual’s personal privacy.

1.2 – HIPAA Compliance
Chapter Six of the HIPAA rules and regulations (i.e. Appendix B) is on the
consumer’s privacy rights. Within the regulation, it states the health care consumer has
the right to know that health care information is treated with confidentiality, that health
4
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care information be protected and not shared with anyone, unless the consumer has
provided written permission. There are three main requirements:
1.

With very few exceptions, individually identifiable heath care information can be
used without written consent for health purposes only, including the provision of
heath care, payment for services, peer review, health promotion, disease
management, and quality assurance.

2. In addition, disclosure of individually identifiable heath care information without
written consent should be permitted in very limited circumstances where there is a
clear legal basis for doing so. Such reasons include medical or health care
research for which an institutional review board has determined anonymous
records will not suffice, investigation of health care fraud, and public health
reporting.
3. To the maximum feasible extent in all situations, nonidentifiable health care
information should be used, unless the individual has consented to the disclosure
of individually identifiable information. When disclosure is required, no greater
amount of information should be disclosed than is necessary to achieve the
specific purpose of the disclosure (The Advisory Commission on Consumer
Protection & Quality in the Health Care Industry, 1999).
As with the SOX regulations the above HIPAA regulations lends to thoughtful
consideration to user roles for accessing information within a medical SQL database.
Access to SQL databases and their tables are through key relationships to and from
another table within one relational SQL database, or data mining across multiple medical
databases it is important to know how each piece of data relates to the overall security of

5
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information. Based on the SOX and HIPAA laws provided above, Table 1 is an
interpretive example of how each field in a data record within one SQL medical billing
table relates to each law.

Table 1  Field Security by User Role

Field

Patient ID

SOX
–
Law
Yes

HIPAA

Law
Yes

User
Activity
Monitored
Yes

Last Name

No

Yes

Yes

First Name

No

Yes

Yes

Middle Name

No

Yes

Yes

Social Security
Number

Yes

Yes

Yes

Street Address

No

Yes

Yes

Suite/Apt
Number

No

Yes

Yes

City

No

Yes

Yes

User Role

Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing

6

Requirement

Create
Read
Read
Read
Read
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
No Access
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
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Zip Code

No

Yes

Yes

Telephone No.

No

Yes

Yes

Insurance
Carrier

Yes

Yes

Yes

Insurance Group
No.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Insurance
Membership
No.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Date Last Billed

Yes

Yes

Yes

Amount Due

Yes

Yes

Yes

Date Last
Payment

Yes

Yes

Yes

Amount Last
Paid

Yes

Yes

Yes

Status

Yes

Yes

No

Last Accessed

Yes

Yes

Yes

Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
Insurers
Clinical & Research
Admissions
Caregivers
Billing
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Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
No Access
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
No Access
Read, Update
Read
No Access
Create, Read, Update
No Access
Read, Update
Read
No Access
No Access
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
No Access
No Access
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
No Access
No Access
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
No Access
No Access
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
No Access
Update
No Access
Create, Read, Update
Read
No Access
No Access
No Access
No Access
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Insurers
Clinical & Research

No Access
No Access

User and role access within a SQL database allow or restrict end users with views.
The roles trigger a specific view that shows only the information the user or group is to
see.
In review of Table 1, note that no user has delete functionality because under
Medicare, the record retention period is 5 years and a patient can file a grievance on a
HIPAA violation up to 6 years (Calloway, 2001/2006). Medical industry best practices
state to retain all records, noting patient statuses such as, active, inactive, or deceased.
Dependent on the institution or organization Information Systems (IS) personnel archive
the patient information that exceeds the statute of limitations (D. Ricci, personal
communication, August 8, 2008).

1.3 – SOX and HIPAA Impact
The impact of the SOX and HIPAA laws have on a SQL medical database, the
application, and the Web interface require scrutiny of the types of data that require
security. Mapping the data aids in identifying areas of concern and too, to note possible
areas of conflicts. Exceptions to the SOX and HIPAA laws require some flexibility
within the IS environment.

1.3.1 – Exceptions to the SOX and HIPAA laws
Under SOX, there are no exceptions to the laws that govern financial reporting,
information security, and accountability. However, under the HIPAA laws there are
several exceptions: medical or health care research for which an institutional review
8
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board has determined anonymous records will not suffice, investigation of health care
fraud, and public health reporting (The Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection &
Quality in the Health Care Industry, 1999). Thus using user role controls within the
database may become convoluted, impede a user from accessing needed information, and
role changes made after the fact, within the IS may possibly break the chain the security
throughout the database, application and Web interface. This is not to say that user roles
should not be used for security purposes, it is however, important that user roles are
planned and designed throughout the IS, and used with other security options to allow for
exceptions and user flexibility.

1.3.2 – Flexible Security Solution with SOX and HIPAA Compliance
The SOX and HIPAA regulations are to protect those with invested interest and
the consumers. While the laws have made it clear what must be done they do not define
how it is to be done. Not knowing how, has made it difficult for those who are
responsible to insure the laws are upheld and has especially been difficult for those
working within Information Systems (History, Overview,, 2008) While there are many
IS security solutions, not all are viable solutions for every organization (Bunker, 2007).
Much planning is needed for security processes through database design, ntier
application development and Web implementation (Singhal, 2007) so as not to break the
chain of security at different levels of technology, yet not burden the end user with
remembering a multitude of passwords, or impeding their ability to work efficiently.

9
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Chapter 2 – Review Literature and Research
In McGovern’s book A Practical Guide to Enterprise Architecture, McGovern
defines thinclient technology as accessing a network either by Internet browser or
specialize client software, to processes information where the client software primarily
focuses on conveying input and output, not processing data. Thinclient is the direct
opposite of fatclient technology where the majority of processing takes places on the
user’s computer and client software and the server is a main storage device. In the thin
client environment, significant data processing occurs at server (McGovern et al., 2004).
Breaches of security through knowledge of an approved user credentials, blended
threats, SQL injection and other malicious activities do occur. In an article on data
security, Litwin states the most vulnerable points that a breach can occur are at the
internal user and workstation, the remote user and workstation, and the Internet.
Breaching of the network hardware security mean data protection is dependent on
measures incorporated into the databases, the applications and the Web interface (Litwin,
2008).
Figure 1 depicts a typical networks security configuration for thin client
technologies. While hardware configurations and third party security solutions are not
part of this study, a quick overview of the configuration is helpful in understanding thin
client technologies. The uses of firewalls, secure switches, and address masking aid in
achieving maximum hardware security. In some facilities, an additional internal firewall,
often referred to as the Clean Firewall is present. The Clean Firewall monitors all
internal Web network activity. The firewall external to the network is the Dirty Firewall

10
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and monitors both incoming and out going Web activity. (B. Williams, personal
communication, July 28, 2008).
2.1– Networking Security

Figure 1 - Typical Network Configuration

Meier in an article on data security for Microsoft’s Web products presents a visual
representation of known Web server vulnerabilities shown in Figure 2. These
vulnerabilities are internal and external to the network. In a medical organization, any
one of these breaches will place sensitive patient and financial information at risk.
1.

Information disclosure and code disclosure obtained from reading unsecured
source code on the Web Site risks unauthorized application changes and
malicious alterations to IS systems.

11
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2. Arbitrary code execution in unrestricted data field entry, results in malicious
crosssite scripting, SQL injection, and path transversal, that result in
unauthorized access to data and information and compromised data.
3. Profiling, is port scans, ping sweeps, banner grabbing and NetBIOSEnumerations
that interfere with authorized user access, responding with information for
unauthorized user access, and malicious interference of IS operations.
4. Denial of Service causing buffer overflows and SYN Floods, that directly
blocking authorize user access.
5. Viruses, Worms and Trojan Horses that are malicious code and programs that
directly compromises data and information, and replicate throughout the IS
systems.
Programmed to monitor and thwart these types of vulnerabilities the dirty firewall
is the first line of defense externally to the Web Server. The internal and clean firewall is
the second line of defense between the Web Server application and the database.

Once

a breach of security occurs at the Web server, it is up to the security designs of the
applications and databases to protect data to meet SOX and HIPAA requirements for
privacy of information.

12
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Figure 2 - Web Server Vulnerabilities

(Meier et al., 2003)

IS personnel incorporate the use of user identification (user ID) and password
combination as the first layer of network access security. According to Singer, IS
personnel often configure user ID and password combinations to replicate throughout the
network to allow for ease of user access to various databases and applications. By
replication of user ID and password, end users do not have to reenter their identification
for each database or application on the network, thus making user access easier and
expedient. However, not every user needs access to every database and application on
the network, therefore each database and application needs added security measures (H.
Singer, personal communication, July 28, 2008)
The user ID and password combination allow a user access to a network, then once on
the network, access to applications or access to database. Each user ID assigned to a role
determines what applications and databases the end user has access. Roles are assigned to
Groups, thus for a user whose job function is admitting patients who come into the
emergency room (ER), the user ID is assigned to the role admission within group ER.
13
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2.1  User ID and Passwords
The baseline of user security begins with whom to allow access to a database, an
application, the Web interface and the network. The Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
and other standardization groups provide standardizations for setup and design, yet each
organization must decide the impact of their added security design on the users.
According to the standards set by the Office of Information Technology Solutions
(OITS), IEEE, and the NIST, there are four standardizations of user ID. One states user
first letter of first name and a minimum of seven characters of the last name. If the name
has fewer than seven characters, or is a common name that has several users such as John
Smith, then numeric assignment to fill the last digits, thus jsmith becomes jsmith01,
jsmith02. The second standardization is first name.last name with the same numeric fill
as above for common names, john.smith or john.smith001. The third is first name _last
name with the same numeric fill as above john_smith or john_smith001. A fourth
standardization is the last name only with a numeric fill as above, for example smith001,
smith002. A standard is eight or more characters, dependent on the operating system or
the use of legacy systems that are eightcharacter restricted.
The password standardization is no fewer then eight characters that are case
sensitive with at least one uppercase, one symbol, and one numeric value (IEEE, 2006).
An example is the password gandolf could then be 6@Nd0lF.
In addition, there are other security methodologies used rather than sole dependency
on ID and password access to secure data and information such as:

14
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1.

Data encryption within the SQL database or the application based on the user ID
and role.

2. Based on the user’s role limited views of data and information.
3. Based on the user’s role limited menu access to an application.
4. Based on the user, sessions limited to access during known working hours.
5. Use of audit logs on network access, and database or application or both that
records, Creation, Read, Update, and Deletion (CRUD) activity along with the
user ID, date, and time of the event.
6. SQL audit table inserts of records field update activity along with the user ID,
data, and time of the event.
7. SQL audit table inserts of the use of Dynamic Linked Libraries (DLL) that trigger
table drops or reconfiguration.
8. SQL updates that insert the last user ID and the date and time of CRUD activity to
the record.
9. Pseudonymization, a technique where identification data is transformed, and
replaced by a specifier that cannot be associated with the identification data
without knowing a certain secret
10. Use of certificates, Secured Socket Layers (SSL) or Kerberos to allow a user
access to a network, database, or application based on need, role or group.
According to McGovern, any combination of the above are used to secure
databases, applications and Web interface. The more combinations that are used, the
more complicated security becomes. Reviewing and testing security practices for their
effectiveness is a good practice. While strengthening security is important, there is a

15

Melissa WinnerLeoni Thesis 2008
chance of interfering with a user’s ability to work efficiently within their software
environment (McGovern et al., 2004).

2.2 – Database Security
Oracle Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, Novell, and International Business
Machines Corporation (IBM) to name just a few, have incorporated the use of user roles
into their network, database, and application management. The premise of roles is to
separate users into groups that allow or denied access to specific software modules or
database tables based on job requirements and what information the position needs to
know. Yet, this is one of the first critical areas for a breach of security between the
application and the database, as shown in Figure 3 (H. Singer, 2008).

Figure 3 - User and Database Roles

While the admissions personnel have access to the medical billing patient table
within the medical billing database, they do not have a need to access to any other
database on the network. Yet, the medical billing database itself does have permissions
to access other databases on the network through the primary key field that is the patient
16
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ID. A breakdown of security occurs when the user role access changes from the
originating user role to the systems database role. The systems database role normally has
administrator privileges, allowing it free access to perform actions that the general user
cannot such as, accessing a trigger that will update tables that the user is not aware of but
are important to data integrity. Thus, when admissions personnel seek additional
information on the patient ID, the other database(s) receive a systems request from the
medical billing database and allows for the CRUD activity of the patient information.
According to Barak in his article, The Proactive Security Toolkit and Applications, this
misinterpretation of the user role can occur within the database security design or the
application security design (Barak, Herzberg, Naor, & Shai, 2002).
Another related security breach can occur when a SQL savvy end user knows the
names of SQL tables that they do not have user access permissions. If this user has the
ability to create tables on the fly within a database, the user may then have the ability to
extrapolate data from a restricted table into the users newly created and owned table
without recognition by the database as a denied user. This user may also have the ability
to assign other users access rights to the newly created table that then offers those users
the ability to view data that they would not normally have access or be privy to.
According to Greenwald in his book, Oracle Essentials, this occurs when the request for
the data to the protected table looks as though it is coming from the system, or the system
administrator and not the originating user (Greenwald, Stackowiak, & Stern, 1999/2004).
2.2.1  User Roles and Groups
Dependent on the organization there could be many roles for groups of users.
Such as role by job function and grouped by departments are used. In a hospital
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environment, this could be admissions – radiology, admissionspediatrics, and
admissionscancercenter. It may not be necessary for the admissions personnel within
one healthcare specialization to see the patient’s private information within another area
specialization, therefore having the personnel grouped by specialization also adds
security (D. Ricci, 2008). Database and application developers design views, encrypt
fields, disable or hide menu offerings, and control general access with the user roles and
groups in mind (Watson et al., 2005).

2.2.2  SQL Database Views
According to Christensen in his book, The Project Manager's Guide to Software
Engineering's Best Practices, there are no hard rules or standards presented by any of the
standardization groups that state all views should be created in the database rather than
the application presentation layer, or conversely (Christensen, Schneider, Thayer, &
Winters, 2001/2003). There are reasons one would be the choice over the other.
1. If creating a new SQL database placing the views within the database is a good
security choice. The reasoning being, is the application developer can then script
to a procedure call based on the user role to the views, which then adds a layer of
security.
2.

If using an old SQL database that contains usable views then placing all the
views within the database makes the same security sense as in item 1 above, but
also preserves design continuity.
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3. If creating an application that crosses platforms with legacy SQL databases and
nonSQL databases then it makes sense to develop the views within the
presentation layer of the application based on the user roles
4. If creating an application for frontend security so as to hide the database, creating
views with alias naming conventions (discussed later under applications) is the
choice (Christensen, Schneider, Thayer, & Winters, 2001/2003).
While restricting views so an end user is not aware that certain information exists
is an excellent security measure, it may not always be possible. Data and information
pulled from legacy system may require data encryption based on user groups and roles.

2.2.3  Data Encryption within the Database
The encryption method to use is dependent on the SQL database and the product
version. At this writing, the most recent versions of Microsoft SQL, Oracle, and Sybase
have Advance Encryption Standard (AES) encryption capability. Earlier versions of
these products offered Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption except for Microsoft
Windows 2000, which did not allow for in record data encryption (Andrews, 2001).
The National Institute of Systems Technology highly supported DES that applies
a 56bit key to each 64bit block of data. That offered 72 quadrillion or more possible
encryption keys. However, in October of 2000 the NIST opted to drop their standard of
tripleDES for the use of AES as it comes in 128, 192 and 256bit versions (Smid, 2001).
When working with data field encryption, developers must plan and be aware of the
ramifications, as it has occurred that a developer has locked everyone, including himself
from viewing data (Woody, 2007). Encryption will slow the retrieval of data since the
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data will have to decrypt for permitted user roles to view the data. For imaging SQL
medical databases such as Picture Archive and Communication Systems (PACS),
encryption may not be a practical option (Riedl, 2008). Pseudonymization may offer an
alternative solution.
2.2.4  Pseudonymization
In his article for the IEEE, Pseudonymization for Improving the Privacy in e
Health Applications, Riedl defines Pseudonymization as a technique where
transformation of identification data occurs and replaced by a specifier. The specifier
cannot be associated with the identification data without knowing a certain secret (Riedl,
2008) such as a Personal Identification Number (PIN). This technique is encryption for
the entire database, not a field or a table, and the database must have at lease two tables.
Riedl states, that one of the tables is that of protected information, and the second table
being the table that contains the pseudonyms and the pseudonymized data. Known as
depersonalization, the process is to remove direct association between the personal
information and the person’s identity. There are two possible ways of depersonalization,
one is with the use of algorithms for calculating the pseudonym and the second is hashing
techniques. Hashing techniques are the least secure, as reversal of hashing requires
access to a stored list of all the pseudonyms. A breach of security can compromise the
stored list and then the data (Riedl, 2008).
Riedl, states that encryption provides a more secure alternative for building
pseudonyms. The process uses a symmetric algorithm to create a secret key that paired
with a user’s asymmetric key allowing access. Because these keys must be kept secret,
they are best applied to smart cards systems or key fob systems as this eliminates
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performing cryptographic operations on open systems, hence one more layer of security.
The down side is that the cards and fobs can be lost or stolen (Riedl, 2008)

2.2.5– SQL Database Update on CRUD
A practice of some medical organizations is to update the SQL database record
each time a record is touch (T. DeLuca, personal communication, August 2, 2008). The
record update takes place as the record closes, and an update to a last access field with
user ID and a time and date stamp. While considered a good practice within the medical
industry, to note the user who was the last to create, read, or update a record, there lacks
the history of every user who has touched the record. Ricci stated that this practice is
good for SQL queries for searching database tables to monitor user activity and the
possible attempt or actual breach of security (D. Ricci, 2008).

2.2.6  Audit Logs and Audit Tables
According to Swanson in her document for NIST standardization, Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, audit
logs are at the server level, the application level and the database level. Used to monitor
user activity at each level, audit logs are useful in determining if someone has attempted
or has breach security. The server level, audit logs record each user’s access, the time of
access and the time of user exit. The application and database developers determine the
activity recorded within the application and database audit logs. The NIST recommend
audit logs in both the database and application (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). The
logs are plain text updates that record user SQL, CRUD, and operational activity which
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can be read and therefore compromised. Writing audit logs to obscure disk locations and
not necessarily on the same server add an additional layer of security. Audit logs offer
accountability, activity reconstruction, intrusion detection and problem detection
information (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008).
Padilla in his article written for the IEEE, Don't Gamble with HIPAA Security
Compliance, states that tracking of user updates to specific data fields and inserting the
information into an audit table is another means of meeting SOX and HIPAA security
requirements. The premise of audit tables is a trigger that will activate on a SQL
UPDATE command that will update an audit table with the old information, the new
information, the user ID, and date and time stamp. Not all record field activity requires
this type of audit however, when items such as, patient name, social security number,
insurance carrier, employer, disease diagnoses, pharmaceuticals, and other protected
information are altered, a record of who made the change, the original data, and the
changed data is a good practice (Padilla, 2005).
2.3 – Application Security
In his book ObjectOriented & Classical Software Engineering, Stephen Schach
states that ObjectOriented Programming (OOP) is quickly becoming the industry
standard for application development. OOP is the foundation of Web based applications
and is layered ntier (Schach, 2007).
In his book Visual C# 2005, Watson states, the theory of OOP is to keep
application coding reusable, consistent, and expedient. The coding patterns make it easy
to change one class without affecting another class or taking a program offline (Watson
et al., 2005). A design flaw or a change in code may cause a breach within the security
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design. As discussed in a previous section an undesirable effect would be for a users’
role to change to a systems role when requesting data or information.
An example of role changes within is the application software is the admissions
personnel in the ER group create a new patient record (Presentation Layer). The ER
Admissions role has limited access to the billing database (Data Storage Layer).
However, a business rule (Business Logic Layer) states to avoid the possibility of
duplicate patient information, a newly created patient ID must replicate to all patient
databases throughout the organization. The ER admissions personnel do not have access
to all of the other databases (Data Storage Layer). The business logic layer calls a
procedure within the database or application, triggering an event with administrative
permissions to update all patient relational databases with the new patient ID. This event
occurs in background however, the user’s permissions should remain in place for all
subsequent transactions.
Each layer of the ntier design, an example of which shown in Figure 4, is for
purpose and functionality of each application. Layered ntier design applications can
either attach to a SQL database or written to contain data within an application data file.
The code containing scripts to attach to a database or output to a named file is located in
the data layer of the ntier application. There is also a layered ntier known as the Model
View Controller (MVC) that directly interfaces with a SQL database from the
presentation layer. While ntier layer design looks exactly like MVC design, the major
difference is that the MVC allows direct interface with the database from the presentation
layer (McGovern et al., 2004).
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Figure 4 - N-tier design layers

According to Monroe in his book, Architectural Styles, Design Patterns, and
Objects: Software Engineering, many of the security method, such as, user views, data
restriction, and data encryption, that are available within SQL database design, are also
available within application design. There are no hard rules regarding which security
method the application handles, and those that the database handles (Monroe, Kompanek,
Melton, & Garland, 2003). Not all layers of the ntier design are specific to security or
should have a security purpose.

2.3.1  Data Storage and Management
There are two schools of thoughts on the data storage and management layer. The
first is allowing access over a network and the second is placing the database behind a set
of database handler routines. According to Britton in his book IT Architectures and
Middleware, allowing access over a network exposes the database to a malicious user.
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Hiding the database behind database handler routines is old technology but allows the
database design to change while preserving the original interface (Britton & Bye, 2004).
While the MVC model does permit OOP applications direct linking to the SQL database,
OOP allows for the use of data field aliases which aides in shielding the database tables
and their data fields. According to Britton, the preferred method is adding an additional
layer of security by hiding the database behind a set of database handler routines.

2.3.2  Data Access Layer
The data access layer provides a simplified means of accessing the data. Rather
than using the standard means of an SQL statement such as Update and Delete, procedure
names that call SQL coded within the database are used, thus allowing the database to
manipulate the data. According to McGovern, using database procedures is an excellent
means of cloaking the database operations from view and from those who do not need
know how the database works. Within many organization’s it is common for the
middleware application developers to have the knowledge of what procedure to call, yet
not the intricate knowledge of how the procedure works within the database (McGovern
et al., 2004). Singer states that while allowing the application developers access to
procedures and not having the complete knowledge of the database is going to extremes
to protect information, HIPAA does state that non identifiable health care information
should be used to maximize security (Singer, 2008).

2.3.3  Business Layer
Christensen in his book The Project Manager's Guide to Software Engineering's
Best Practices, states that the business layer compartmentalizes calculations and the
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business rules. Also divided by activities, the code within the business layer is
responsible for pulling a medical image from a PACS database or a recent prescription
from a pharmacy database based on user request. As stated earlier, the risk is the code
call for data access using administrative permissions to a secondary database for one
purpose and not returning the original user permissions thus, giving the user access to
data that the user should not have access to (Christensen & Thayer, 2001).

2.3.4  User Interface Layer
Britton in his book, IT Architectures and Middleware, states the user interface
layer is the directions to the business layer to respond in a certain way when the user
enters information, clicks on a button, or depresses key within the presentation layer
view. The user interface layer is solely for functionality within the presentation layer and
workflow and not for security (Britton & Bye, 2004).

2.3.5  Presentation Layer
The presentation layer is what the user see’s. If not using the SQL database
views, then the views based on the user role, are part of this layer, as are active menu
selections. According to Britton, if the application requirements call for the use of
encryption, this is the layer where the encryption scripting takes place (Britton & Bye,
2004). As with database encryption, the NIST recommends AES.
2.4 - Web Publishing Security
Publishing an application to a Web server varies on the software and technology
used. Each supplier has security tools to aid in publishing and securing a Web Portal
using standard security tools:
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1. Use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) that is the IT Industry standard for security
technology that establishes an encrypted link between a Web Server and a users
browser using Public Key and Private Key certificates.
2. Public and private keys certificates also work with a third party entity known as
the certificate authority to match the keys. Private keys are created with several
lines of data known only to the host, are digitally encrypted using a mathematical
formula. The certificate authority validates the user and the public key, and then
matches the public key with the private key to allow access.
3. Kerberos is an authentication protocol developed by Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT). Kerberos is freely available from MIT, and made available in
many commercial products (Basch, 1990/2008). Kerberos requires the use of
secretkey cryptography much like that discussed under Pseudonymization. In
Microsoft’s security (Figure 7), the SSL technology is optional while Kerberos is
a required security methodology, compared to Oracle (Figure 6) where SSL
combined with key certificates is the primary security methodology.
Microsoft’s instructions for publishing states that a review of connection settings,
membership settings and other security setting on the Web server before publishing and
to disable debugging, tracing, and custom errors after publishing (How To: Publish Web,
2005). Each vendor has their own means of securing their Web server(s). IBM suggests
access scanning on demand using Nessus tool as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5  Websphere On Demand Security Scan

(IBM Websphere Portal, 2006)

Oracle uses a blend of Secure Socket Layers (SSL), credentials and key
encryption to secure their Web Server. The wallet as shown in Figure 6, manages public
key security credentials. A public key is a value provided by a designated authority
(Usually a database administrator (DBA) or systems administrator (SA).) as an
encryption key that, combined with a private key allows a user, Web server access.
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Figure 6  Oracle Public Key Infrastructure

(Hale & Levinger, 2003)
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Microsoft, shown in Figure 7, uses a combination of their own security products,
combined with SSL or Kerberos or both.

Figure 7 - Microsoft Web Security

(Meier et al., 2003)

Shepherd, Zitner and Watters recommend using different access rules for each user role
(Shepherd, Zitner, & Watters, 2000) as do Oracle, SAP, Microsoft and IBM. Dependent
on some technologies, access becomes available when users have matching keys or
certificates. The question is what portal security is the best fit for the application and
database designs, as it may come down to a combination of some of the above, or other
recommended technologies used by specific vendors.
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2.4.1 – Certificates and SSL
There are various schools of thought regarding using certificates to secure access
between the end user thinclient and the Web server and the application. According to
Jonathan Kames the advantages and disadvantages of SSL over Kerberos are:
1. Advantages
a.

SSL does not require an accessible trusted third party to establish a secure
connection.

b. SSL does not require the user to have a secret certificate or PIN.
2. Disadvantage
a.

If a system is compromised revocation certificates have to be circulated to
all relevant servers and cached for a long time.

b. Servers have to verify incoming user certificates against a revocation
server and in that case, the revocation server must be highly available to a
third party. In this case, the use of a third party eliminates the purpose of
using SSL. (Kamens, 2000)
2.4.2 – Breaching of Network Information and Code Disclosure
While on any Web page, clicking on the browser menu option of View, and then
on the menu option Source will allow the user to read the source code of that page in
plain text. HyperText Markup Language (HTML), Extensible Markup Language (XML),
and HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) are the base of Web publishing and at the heart
of thinclient technology. Compiled code in Java, C++, C#, Visual Basic or other
application design products assists in stopping a malicious intruder from seeing private
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information. The source may reference the application code by description such as,
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript"> but the compiled code itself is not
readable. This is why Microsoft recommends that prior to publishing a Web application
that a review of connection settings, and membership settings be preformed and to
disable debugging, tracing, and custom errors after publishing (How To: Publish Web,
2005). The World Wide Consortium (W3C) is currently working on security
documentation to cover the WEB industry best practices. Today they support using a
combination of both SSL, Kerberos, and using AES as standards for WEB portal security
(W3C, 2008).
Oracle, Microsoft, IBM, Novell, Apache, and other vendors, all have hardware
and protocol solutions to help block intruders from obtaining information and code access
however, such intrusions happen. The blocking of intrusion with hardware configuration,
protocol settings and additional protection software goes beyond the limits of this study.
Yet how to defend the application code and network information is an important issue to
address, and should be part of every Webbased software planning.
2.5 – Summary of Security Practices
The standard for IS, is to first use user ID and password combinations to allow
access to servers, applications, and databases. When using Microsoft’s products the user
ID and password is authenticated through the IIS and passed on to the .net application,
which in turn passes the authentication through to the Microsoft SQL Server and
database. If all medical organizations solely use Microsoft products this would simplify
security procedures, yet this is not realistic. Many medical organizations have legacy
database operations and other nonMicrosoft servers, databases and applications in use.
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Thus various security procedures are used to protect internal financial information and
patient privacy information (Bunker, 2007), and user ID and password is only the
beginning of security procedures.
The use of user roles and groups is the second link in the security chain as they
help to define what each user can do while accessing the servers, applications and the
databases. Application developers and DBA’s design views, and perform encryption on
data fields based on the user roles and groups (Christensen, Schneider, Thayer, &
Winters, 2001/2003) and the SA’s block user access to applications and databases based
on user roles and groups and timed sessions. Since some legacy systems do not
recognize or cannot recognize roles, user certificates, keys and data encryption become
another link in the chain of security. However, SQL savvy personnel and people with
malicious intent can breach these security processes. Thus, the audit logs and tables track
possible breaches of security, and to help locate where the breach in security or the
weakness in security take place (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008).
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Chapter 3 – Security Methodologies
When E.F. Codd made his ground breaking speech in 1969 on the relational
database model (Codd, 1969), and the use of SQL, he understood the importance of raw
data and how to covert data to excellent information. Codd saw the relational database as
data repository with strong table relationship and strong data normalization. Codd never
discussed SQL as a programming language. Nor did Codd discuss how to use SQL to
control data input, and to be procedural. Yet within only a decade, the relational database
model became the foundation of database structure for vendors such as Oracle, Microsoft,
and eventually IBM. SQL became more than a means for querying data as it also became
a means for data manipulation. According to Casteel in her book Oracle 10g SQL, the
problem with SQL is that it is open code and is easily read and interpreted. Anyone
having access to the database can virtually see the database structure, read the code,
change the code and manipulate the data (Casteel, 2006/2007). Casteel states, the best
practice within the Oracle environment is to use Programming Language (PL), PL/SQL
to create procedures, functions and triggers to hide the general SQL CRUD scripts from
the general user. The term TSQL or Transact SQL is the term used within other SQL
environments and performs the same programming functions.
To go an additional step in order to protect the data, developers use complied
code such as 4gl, Visual Basic, Java, C++, C# and a host of other software development
tools to create frontend applications solutions to shield the SQL database completely
from the endusers. As SQL has grown, developers have also incorporated additional
means of securing data within the SQL database itself. No longer is the SQL database
solely a relational model data repository.
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When each user logs into an IS there is a cause and effect across a network. What
the user views on the main menu is that which the IS personnel have programmed and
developed for that specific user or user group. While some IS personnel subscribe to
showing all menu options and disabling options for specific users and groups others
create menu views specific to a user or group. According to Ricci, medical industry’s
best practice is to show only the menu items specific to a user, role, or group, thus
limiting user knowledge of other network applications and databases. (D. Ricci, 2008)
While this seems elementary, much work goes into developing the different views and
testing user access to assure the user does not erroneously have access permissions to
other application and databases (H. Singer, 2008). For end user ease of access to the
applications and databases servers across the network, replicate the user ID and
password. However, each server, application and database has a set of permissions for
the user, role or group. Thus, recognition of each user, role, and group takes place and
access allowed or denied by the servers. If the server has several applications or
databases and the user or group has access rights to one of them, then the server allows
access. With the use of user schema, it is up to application or database to recognize the
user role or group and allow or deny access. Yet, there are probabilities of security
breaches with limited knowledge of user ID, group and password.
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ϖ
Figure 8 - User Login Cause and Effect

SQL databases contain schemas for user ID and passwords, roles and groups.
Dependent on the organization users can log in directly into a database or through a front
end application. According to Casteel in her book Oracle9i, the problem with allowing
users to log directly into a database is that they have better opportunity to manipulate data
such as creating their own tables, copying data from one table to another, authorizing
other user’s access to their own created tables, and performing global updates (Casteel,
2003). User permission counters these types of activities and there are no rules,
standards, or regulations stating that direct connectivity to a relational database through
thinclient is unacceptable. However, it is highly recommended that a middleware
application be the access point and a level of protection between the Web server and the
database (Meier et al., 2003).
Within medical organizations, there is often a melding of technology. The billing
database may be on an Oracle 10g PL/SQL solution, while the Siemens PACS is using
Microsoft SQL 2008 and the patient history database is located on a legacy IBM Informix
based mainframe. The systems administrator user ID and password does not have to be
the same for each system, nor does the systems administrator User ID and password for
one IS and environment have to allow full access rights the other IS’s and environments
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(B. Williams, 2008). With varying administrator passwords a database compromised by
use of the administrator password and ID on one IS system, dose not necessarily
compromise the data on the other IS systems.
3.1– Security Breach Beyond User ID or Group
Once a user ID and password authenticates allowing access to a network,
applications, and database a probability of SQL injection and other malicious activity
increases, developers must code and script security measures into their applications and
databases. According to Bunker in his article, Is Your Privacy Protected? malicious
activity is a process of invention and it is very difficult to anticipate every possible
security breach (Bunker, 2008). This is why audit logs and tables become very important
for reconstruction of events. Using the information obtained from the logs, developers of
SQL databases and applications can build in additional security measures (Swanson &
Guttman, 1996/2008). However, planning and taking precautions during the design and
development phases to counter the known malicious activity is the best strategy (Bunker,
2008).
3.1.1 – Limiting the Possibilities for SQL Injection and Malicious Activity
SQL injection attacks occur when SQL commands inserted into a field of entry,
such as the User Id field, reveals or manipulates data other than the fields intended use.
This can be one SQL command or procedural SQL scripts, dependent on how many
characters the field allows. As an example, one of the mean for gaining access to a
database is for a hacker to enter into the user ID field the SQL statement below.
‘UNION SELECT id, name, ‘’, 0 FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype = ‘U’
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Due to the flexibility of SQL, the SQL interpretation to the above line is as a selection
request for all users from the user table.
‘UNION SELECT 0, UserName, Password, 0 FROM users –
The SQL response is a list of the data contained in the users table of user ID’s and
Passwords. The hacker can then select any one of the user ID and password and then
gain access to the database. According to Jansen in an article written for the NIST,
Computer Security, in this situation, the developers will want to restrict the use of
specialized characters and length of the field (Jansen W., T., & Scarfone, 2008). What
presents a problem is that in limiting specialized characters such as the apostrophe (‘) or
hyphen () affects the ability to use the proper form of user names, such as jo’day01 or
john_o’day.
If a user ID and password is a known element then the hacker only has to insert
SQL into fields of entry screen to change or manipulate data. According to Litwin, three
features make SQL injection attacks quite powerful:
1. With the use of hyphens the hacker has he ability to embed comments within a
SQL statement and into a data field.
2. The hacker has the ability to alter or destroy data by stringing multiple SQL
statements together, and to execute them in a batch.
3. Using SQL to query metadata from a standard set of system tables to obtain or
alter data (Litwin, 2008).
Litwin states, the best defense is limiting the number of characters allowed in data fields
(Litwin, 2008). By limiting the number of characters, SQL injection is difficult and near
impossible because the SQL statement truncates to the character length restriction. Thus
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the statement ‘UNION SELECT id, name, ‘’, 0 FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype = ‘U’
on an eight character restriction truncates to ‘UNION S which the application will either
deny user access or throw an error.
According to Jansen, another concern of SQL injection is that some organization
will use multiple interpreters in tandem with other applications. A harmful operation can
unobtrusively be passed through the IS from one database or application to another
compounding the problem.
3.1.2 – Limiting User by Views
Using the data fields from Table 1, Chapter 1, Figure 9, reflects an example for
planning and development of the user views. As a hypothesis, assume that an individual
with malicious intent has found a means to log into a medical application or database.
Depending on the identification assumed is what information presents itself in either a
view, or a SQL inquiry. According to Singer, while views and field encryption keep the
honest employee, honest, the truth is, that anyone with malicious intent will still be able
to obtain private data dependent on the user ID and group permissions used. If the
intruder breached the administrator user ID and password, then all data is available within
that database (H. Singer, 2008) In his article, Oracle Database Security, Nathan Aaron
addresses theses issues. Aaron states poor database view designs, poor user access
schema design, and placing too much trust in employees regarding data access can be the
cause of users becoming dishonest (Aaron, 2006).
As previously discussed, a user with the appropriate privileges can create a table
and give another user access privileges to the table. Thus using the planning views and
encryption in Figure 9, should the admissions user have the privilege to create a table and
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gives a caregiver rights to the newly created table, the caregiver now sees all of the fields
that are denied under the care giver group.

Figure 9 - Planning Views and Encryption

Greenwald in his book Oracle Essentials, also states that planning and testing of
user views in combination with user access rights is an a important practice of DBA’s
(Greenwald et al., 1999/2004). Both Aaron and Greenwald note that allowing users the
rights to create tables and assign other users privilege to their tables are security wise
problematic.

40

Melissa WinnerLeoni Thesis 2008
3.1.3 – Employee Security Breach
According to NIST, security breaches do not always come from the outside.
Whether it is a disgruntled employee, an employee in financial difficulty attempting to
make extra monies selling information, or just by shear accident, an employee can often
find a way to access data and information that they are not privy to, or information
needed to perform their job function. This is where role specific views, or database or
data field encryption are useful. However, the update of user ID with a date and time
stamp into a record when any CRUD activity occurs is an additional security measure
(Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008).
As a new supposition, assume that several patients have complained that they
have recently been contacted by an insurance carrier representative, who has seemed to
know their information regarding current insurance carrier, the dates of their admissions
for medical care, and worst, has ran credit checks based on their social security number.
SQL queries ran on the billing database, patient table, on the last accessed field of each
record, can quickly show the count of records accessed on various dates or date ranges by
each end user. According to DeLuca, A spike by one user compared to other users could
be representative of a user misusing their position and their access to secure patient
information. Some medical organization run scheduled SQL queries weekly or monthly,
on this type of activity to note end user access anomalies (T. DeLuca, 2008). Comparing
the user’s activity to audit logs and tables will provide additional information such as,
were the records accessed for read only purposes or were updates made and type of
updates.
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3.1.4 – Troubleshooting with audit logs and audit tables
Rebecca Sausner, in an article from the Bank Technology News Keeping Your
DBA Honest notes that when George Clooney was hospitalized, that a review of the
hospitals database audit logs noted every doctor and nurse who violated patient trust by
celebrity snooping on his medical records. However, if the DBA was the one snooping,
he knew how to cover his tracks (Sausner, 2008). While third party software is not a part
of this study, it is important to note that third party electronic signature software exists,
that tracks audit logs and notes if a breach of a log occurs.
The use of application and database audit logs show errors within the application,
process timing, time stamps of events, and user authentication changing from the user to
a system or administrative user. The audit logs are invaluable for troubleshooting and for
noting security breaches (Swanson & Guttman, 2008). The user SQL logs reflect the
actual SQL scripts and the application is reflecting the application scripts.
A sample user SQL audit log may look like the following:
jsmith01

10:35:16:08:15:2008 SELECT * FROM billing WHERE pid = 12345

jsmith01

10:35:16:08:15:2008 SUCCESS 1 row returned

The corresponding application audit log may look like the following:
jsmith01

10:35:16:08:15:2008 received from frm_patientR patient_id = 12345

jsmith01

10:35:16:08:15:2008 service call get_patient

jsmith01

10:35:16:08:15:2008 patient_id 12345 found

jsmith01

10:35:16:08:15:2008 frm_admsView refresh ss_no encrypt

Where the application is concerned several security measures are in place, the
paient_id is an alias for the database field pid. A procedure get_patient contains the
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compiled code to access the database, and possible a call to a database procedure thus
hiding the database name, and the SQL table name within the database. Record retrieval
to the application shows the end users assigned view that encrypts the social security
number. No one reading the application audit log will gain knowledge of the database,
unlike user SQL audit logs that record ever SQL script ran and provide information
regarding the table accessed and the field name.
Unlike the SQL server in which audit logs must be located on the server, the user
SQL and application audit logs, can write to alternate locations (Howie, 2002).
According to Williams, in the thinclient environment, the last place that one would want
the user SQL or application audit logs to write is to a workstation hard drive. The SQL
logs and the application logs grow very quickly in size, if left on their respective servers
they could easily interfere with processing and space allocation. The industry best
practice is to select an obscure server for writing user SQL and application audit logs.
This has a drawback in possible loss of processing speed and in maintenance (B.
Williams, 2008).
3.2 – Database Design Security
As previous noted many security methodologies overlap between the database and
the application. However, whether planning a SQL database from scratch or
implementing an existing SQL database into the thinclient environment there are SQL
database security methodologies to consider beyond the user ID and password, groups,
logs and views.
According to the NIST, use of audit tables to note changes to a data record by
inserting the original data, the changed data and the user ID with date and time stamp is a
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security methodology to consider (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). The NIST also
recommends creating audit tables that record Dynamic Link Library (DLL) changes in
activity such as table creations, table reconfiguration, and table drops. When this type of
DLL call takes place, an insert into an audit table takes place with the table information
and the user ID with date and time stamp (Singhal, 2007). Additional database security
options are:
1. Use of AES data encryption standardization for encryption of a SQL database
2. Use of AES data encryption standardization for encryption of a data record field
3. Use of procedures, functions and triggers called in scripts by name
4. Limiting the data field input through the use of forced data selection
5. Limiting by number data field entry characters
6. Disallowing special character entry within data fields
7. Restricting user session times to work hours
8. Restricting users from table creation or table drops
9. Restricting users from table sharing (Kiely, 2005)
3.2.1 – AES Data Encryption
As previously discussed, AES data encryption is the current standard of NIST
(Smid, 2001). However, there are performance issues with the use of encryption (Riedl,
2008). Image databases such as PACS would not only use a lot of equipment processing
time to encrypt and decrypt but also, be a hindrance to a user waiting for the decryption
process to complete (Riedl, 2008). Yet, the use of encryption and decryption on character
data is expedient (Smid, 2001). Encryption of the database or only selected data fields of
each table are encrypted depends on the sensitivity of the data they contain and how the
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data is linked to the application and the Web portal. When a SQL database directly links
to a Web portal, IT industry best practice is to encrypt the database (Shepherd et al.,
2000). If a middleware application shields the database then encryption of sensitive data
fields is an acceptable practice (Smid, 2001). Configuring a database, data table, or data
field for encryption, results in the objects encryption until a user retrieves the data.
Decryption of data occurs when the user’s access privileges give the user access to the
data to perform CRUD activities. If the user has access privileges to some of the data but
not all, the items that the user does not have access to will remain encrypted.
3.2.2 – Procedures, Functions and Triggers
Casteel in her book, Oracle 9i Developer explains the expediency of
programming PL/SQL procedures, functions and triggers due to compacting code in one
specific script that called by name by another SQL script, performs SQL calculations and
CRUD activities. Considered an IS industry best practice, the writing of procedures,
functions and triggers enhances the functionality through reuse of scripts and not
displaying SQL activity to the end user (Casteel, 2006/2007). Powell in his book Oracle
10g Database Administrator Implementation & Administration takes this a step further
explaining that the use of procedures, functions and triggers are security features to
protect data integrity and the functionality of the database from the users (Powell &
McCullough, 2007). The use of procedures, functions and triggers within a database
allows for the developers of a middleware software application to call each by name, thus
adding another layer of security between the application and the database by not
revealing table name, field names, or database functionality information from within the
application (McGovern et al., 2004).
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3.2.3 – Limiting Data and Disallowing Special Characters
While discussed earlier, the methodology of limiting data entry and disallowing
special characters is used to thwart malicious activity such as SQL injection, however
there are other security reasons to limit data, and stop users from using special characters.
Controlling fields of data by drop down boxes, radio box selection and field length
maintains data integrity. While data selection will not stop the occasional selection of
Mr. when Mrs. was intended, it will stop other typographical errors that make it difficult
to perform accurate data extrapolation to obtain information. Data restriction makes it
difficult for anyone to change data globally within the database, thus the inability to
change all records to Mr. (Powell & McCullough, 2007).
Special characters such as the asterisk (*) have meaning within the SQL language.
The asterisk in SQL means everything, thus having a field containing an * can make it
difficult to extrapolate data by interfering with the original SQL Select statement
(Casteel, 2006/2007). As discussed under SQL injection limiting special characters and
restring field length stops a user from entering SQL commands such as, Update patient
Set ptitle = Mr., into an entry field and globally changing every patient file, ptitle field,
in the patient table to Mr. (Jansen W., T., & Scarfone, 2008).
3.2.4 – Restricting Users
A concern of DBA’s is restricting users to such a point that they are rendered
incapable of performing their job function, and is why testing user access is extremely
important (Powell & McCullough, 2007). However, it is also extremely important to
assure that user access is not manipulated or misused. Restricting user session access to
their working hours, sharing user created tables, and the right to create tables is a high
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security consideration (IEEE, 2006). Restricting users falls under the user schema as
discussed earlier and noted here solely as an accompaniment to database security.

3.3 - Application Design Security
Meir, in an article on design patterns on Microsoft’s Web site states five security
practices to make when designing a Web middleware application:
1. Assume all input is malicious.
2. Centralize your approach.
3. Do not rely on clientside validation.
4. Be careful with canonicalization issues.
5. Constrain, reject, and sanitize your input (Meier et al., 2003, p. 4)
An example of malicious input is SQL injection as discussed above, and thwarted by
limiting the number of characters allowed into a field.
3.3.1 – Malicious Activity
Some data fields cannot be restricted to a small number of characters. What if the
field of entry is a narrative field such as a patient diagnoses? When writing the code for
the medical Web application, directing an insert of HTML text tags before and after any
narrative data field will render the malicious code to text and strip it of functionality.
Anyone with malicious intent inserting a SQL command such as, DELETE * FROM
patient into a data field, results in an insert into the database <text> DELETE * FROM
patient< /text>, and not the deletion all the data contained in the SQL database table
named patient (Meier et al., 2003). As discussed under SQL Injection rejecting special
characters such as: %, , //, < >, =, +, ∑ is another option, however within the medical
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environment this may be too restrictive for the clinical end users who need to comment or
reference scientific formulas or data, thus the use of HTML tags is also the
recommendation of the W3C (W3C. 2008).
3.3.2 – Canonical Restraint
As previously discussed, layered ntier OOP application design allows for writing
code by reuse of patterns, thus making the process expedient and consistent. According
to Fowler in his book Patterns of Enterprise Application Architecture, poor programming
practices are hard coding of path locations, specific data values, and pointers to specific
server names (Fowler et al., 1963/2003). Yet, what if part of a user’s responsibility is
importing data from external data source, such as the cost of medical supplies from a
supplier, or insurance payment rates for procedures? For our discussion purposes, we
will state that the import file downloads to a secure server and a specific directory.
Rather than hard coding the path into the application, create a SQL system data table,
designed to contain paths and pointers. The form view references the SQL systems table
obtains the correct data location, limiting the user to a location, yet allowing the user to
select the appropriate file to import. This process works in conjunction with user access
and logins, and the user must have permissions to the secure server, directory and file
(Meier et al., 2003).
3.3.3 – Restricting Users
Restricting user menu selections, limiting the information seen by creating user
role specific views, and designing field drop down boxes for restricted field data selection
are tools that aid in keeping data accurate and secure. According to the IEEE, within the
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thinclient environment, these tools become more important to data security (IEEE,
2006), as they limit the possibilities for misuse and incorrect data entry.
Calling database procedures rather then using SQL CRUD scripts within the
application code, hides the identity of the database and the SQL processes from the end
users adding an additional layer of security. According to Watson, limiting the calls for
sys or sysadm roles and making sure the user’s credentials authenticate throughout all
application and database processes maintains the user roles security. If possible, limit the
session times that a user can access the application to their regular working hours
(Watson et al., 2005).
3.2 – Summary of Methodologies
While there is overlapping of security methodologies between the SQL database
and application Table 2 below depicts the methodologies discussed. An important note is
that some methodologies work in tandem or individually, either within the database or the
application dependent on the technologies used and the data location. As an example,
database encryption would eliminate the use of field encryption within the application.
Yet, if the application pulls from two data sources such as a SQL database and a legacy
database, field encryption may take place at the SQL database while the legacy field
encryption takes place at the presentation layer of the application.

Table 2  Security Methodologies

Security Methodology

SQL
Database
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Use of User ID and password validation for IS

Yes

Yes

Creating user views based on user roles.

Yes

Yes

Configuring audit logs on server.

Yes

Yes

Creating database and application audit logs

Yes

Yes

Limiting character entries to an appropriate length, for

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

authorization.

the data contain in the data fields.
Eliminating use of special characters that SQL would
interpret as a command function
Designing data entry to insert HTML tags to render
malicious SQL code injection harmless
Limiting field entry to drop down selection items that are
specific to the type of data requested and not left to user
input.
Limiting user menus selections to only those applications
and databases the user needs in order to perform their job
function.

Saving user database and application log activity to an
obscure server
Creating audit tables within the database to track CRUD
activity of private information
Creating audit tables within the database to track table
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DLL activity especially the activity that pertain to table
creation and table drops.
Use of procedures, functions and triggers called by name

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

rather than general CRUD statements
Use of field name aliases to conceal database tables and
fields
Use of AES encryption to conceal data contained within
a database or data fields.
Limit user sessions to business hours or work schedule to
prevent illegal access during nonbusiness hours.
Controlling access by authorized users by using SSL,
Kerberos, or key certificates

Using all 18 methodologies within a thinclient environment between the SQL
database, its software application and Web Server interface is very probable. Dependent
on the technologies in place, the use of data extrapolated from legacy systems, and new
SQL database design vs. older SQL database design determines where and how each is
applied.
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Chapter 4 – Analysis and Results
While stated in Chapter 1 that the medical industry did not have a history to assist
when planning security to meet the HIPAA and SOX regulations, today it does (D. Ricci,
2008). IS security best practices developed over the past ten years through lessons
learned, and with the aid of IEEE, NIST, W3C, and OITS have assisted with the
development of the 18 methodologies. However, how to deploy the security solutions and
in what circumstances is left to IS personnel to plan, design and implement.
4.1 SQL Database Security
As previously discussed, due to the risks of exposure through Web technologies
there are issues to consider when planning SQL database security within the thinclient
environment. Table 3 below depicts the planning questions and comments

Table 3  Database Security Considerations

Question
Is this an existing SQL

Response

Comments

Y/N

Name of database

Is this a new SQL database? Y/N

Name of database

Use of a middleware

Name of application

database?

Y/N

application
AES database encryption

Y/N

AES table record field

Y/N

Names of tables, and fields for encryption
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encryption
User Views

Y/N

Naming convention of user views

Procedures

Y/N

Naming convention procedures

Functions

Y/N

Naming convention of functions

Triggers

Y/N

Naming convention of triggers

Audit SQL logs

Y/N

Naming convention of logs and storage path

Audit Tables

Y/N

Naming convention of tables, and the field
names of data to record

User rights to create tables

Y/N

User groups with rights

User rights to share tables

Y/N

User groups with rights

Session restriction

Y/N

User groups with restrictions

Smart card access

Y/N

Key Fob access

Y/N

Certificate access

Y/N

4.1.1 – Planning Security for Thinclient Implementation with an Existing SQL Database
Planning security for an existing SQL database involved many of the same
processes that are involved with the creation of a new SQL database. An additional item
of consideration is the ramifications of possibly having to alter the security features
within the database. Other tasks and considerations are as follows:
1. A review of each table, the data it contains and planning for the CRUD activities
of the end users as in the billing table reflected in Table 1.
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2. Data mapping user roles and groups as in Figure 9, to note what fields require
data encryption (if any) and the screen views for users.
3. Review of the data contained in the SQL database and making the decision to
encrypt the entire database due to the sensitive nature of the database.
4. Deciding if a middleware application would better secure the database and if so:
a. Are the views and encryption going to be within the application or the
database?
i. If so, consideration on how to remove the current security features
of views and encryption from the current database without
affecting the users and the reliability of the database.
ii. If not, consideration on how to interface the current security
features with the application without affecting the users and the
reliability of the database.
b. Are the current triggers, functions and procedures naming conventions
within the database consistent or do they required revisions?
c. Would the interface to application require additional triggers, functions,
and procedures to secure the database?
5. Are there fields for data entry that can be restricted to drop down selections?
6. Are there fields for data entry that can be restricted in length?
7. Are there SQL audit logs, and if so, where are they stored?
8. Are there the current audit tables within the SQL database sufficient?
Although the SQL database is in production and functioning, the review will help
to assure HIPAA and SOX compliance. While the database may have met the
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requirements under fatclient technology, the exposure to the Web and using thinclient
may require additional security features. As an example, currently some user
permissions allow session table creation to obtain information for clinical trials. While
the information the users obtain is not patient specific or may use a patient identification
number with no name associated, the ability to create the table and access data tables
directly using SQL commands presents a security issue within thinclient (Greenwald et
al., 1999/2004). Possibly a new reporting feature, or a new view to extrapolate patient
related, yet not patient specific information is created, using the users criteria, rather than
allowing session table creation. The design would call procedures and functions by name
rather than directly perform SQL commands, thus adding another layer of security. The
premise is not to make the endusers job more difficult; it is to comply with SOX and
HIPAA regulations to secure data. As long as the reporting or view offers the end user
the information sought in the performance of job function then the feature meets both
security and user’s needs .
4.1.2  Planning Security for Thinclient Implementation with a New SQL Database
As a fellow student in my Database Concepts class, David Kizhner, so aptly
stated during a discussion on data normalization “It is about the data, the whole data and
nothing but the data, so help me Codd” (D. Kizhner, 2007). Security is all about the
protection of data, SOX and HIPAA are all about the protection of individuals’ sensitive
personal data. Considered to be an IS industry best practice is to include security features
within each phase of design, development and implementation (McGovern et al., 2004).
Knowing that the database implementation will be within thinclient technologies, makes
planning for security more focused and does not change the questions asked as outline in
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section 4.1.1 except in the form of how are these features are implemented, not are these
features currently implemented.
Knowing that the database will have a frontend application does beg the question
as to whether the database will control the AES encryption, or if application will use AES
encryption. The same applies to Views, Triggers Procedures and Functions. Again, there
are no hard rules stating that one is a better practice over the other (Monroe, Kompanek,
Melton, & Garland, 2003). Using one security feature within the database and another
within the application does not mean that one or the other is a best practice. However,
consistence in design is an IS industry best practice and is extremely important for future
changes over the life cycle of the database and its middleware application (Powell &
McCullough, 2007). The ramifications of incorporating one security feature within the
database and another within the application are considerations. While in certain
circumstances, it may be best to use AES encryption at the database level, or fields within
the database, it may be best to design views and limit field character length at the
application level.
4.2 – Application Security Design

As within the database design the question involving the application design
revolve around the whether or not the application is an existing application with an
additional feature added or if this is a new application design for the use of thinclient
technologies. The processes of questions are slightly different due to the knowledge that
this application will access the SQL database and work with the database to manipulate
data. Thus, many of the database features are a consideration.
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Table 4  Application Security Considerations

Question
Is this an existing

Response

Comments

Y/N

Name of application

Is this a new application?

Y/N

Name of application

Will the application use

Y/N

Name of database

application?

aliases to access the

Naming conventions of aliases

database table and fields
Will the application use

Y/N

MVC to access the
database?
Is AES record field

Y/N

encryption done at the

Names of tables, and fields encrypted – user,
roles and groups affected.

database level?
AES record field encryption

Y/N

Names of tables, and fields for encryption –
user roles and groups affected.

Are database views used?

Y/N

Names of views and purpose of views – user,
roles, and groups affected

Are application views used?

Y/N

Naming convention of views – user, roles, and
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groups affected.
Are application procedures

Y/N

used?
Are database procedures

of procedures
Y/N

used?
Are functions used?

Naming convention of procedures and purpose

Procedure names, and when to call the
procedure

Y/N

Naming convention of functions and purpose
of function

Are database functions

Y/N

used?
Triggers

Functions names, and when to call the
functions

Y/N

Naming convention of triggers and when to
call the trigger

Are the database triggers

Y/N

Trigger names, and when to call the triggers

Y/N

Names of fields and restriction

used?
Field length restrictions
Field entry type restrictions

Names of fields and type restriction

Application logs

Y/N

Naming convention of logs and storage path

User access by user, role

Y/N

Naming conventions

Session restriction

Y/N

User groups with restrictions

Smart card access

Y/N

Key Fob access

Y/N

Certificate access

Y/N

and groups
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While stated in section 2.3.1 that hiding the database behind database handler
routines, is old technology but allows the database design to change while preserving the
original interface (Britton & Bye, 2004), it is important to note that this is considered one
of the better security practices. Using the applications to call by name the database
procedures and functions minimizes the risk of code disclosure (Swanson & Guttman,
1996/2008).
4.2.1  Planning Security for Thinclient Implementation with a Middleware Application
One of the medical industries problems with implementation of new technologies
is the existence of many legacy IS systems (Bunker, 2008). When faced with adding new
technologies, issues and problems occur due to forced restrictions or constraints because
of the legacy systems limitations. Questions occur regarding programming consistency,
such as; since one of the middleware application modules must use AES encryption due
to the legacy systems constraints, do all application modules thereafter have to use AES
encryption at the application level? There is no rule that states that developers must
continue to use old technology within new projects due to the limitation of legacy
systems (McGovern et al., 2004). The important fact is to be consistent with the
programming practices within the same programming module. Thus, if using AES
encryption at the database field level, then throughout the life cycle of the database and
its middleware application module, all AES encryption takes place at the database. IS
industry best practice is to note security features within the database and to build upon
security within the application and not duplicate (McGovern et al., 2004). Using the
questions in Table 4, if the answer to AES field encryption at the database level is yes,
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then there is no reason to use AES encryption within the application. The same may or
may not hold true for views.
The views at the database level may be strictly for users directly accessing the
database outside of the thinclient technology. The views constructed within the database
may not meet the criteria for restricting views within the thinclient application. If the
criteria for the thinclient environment specifically state that no user has access directly to
the database, then the requirement calls for application designed views. Thus, it is
probably to have views in both the database and within the application (Meier et al.,
2003). What is important is that the views meet the security requirements of the user,
role, and groups. Another scenario is that an application view calls a database view that is
read only, thus meeting the user’s needs to view certain data without directly
manipulating the data within the database, and meeting the application security of using a
named object call to the database which shields the original source from detection.
The use of the database functions, procedures and triggers greatly reduces
application programming time and the chance of misinterpretation of the database
functionality (Powell & McCullough, 2007). While the application may have some
procedures for database access and other application functionality, using the database
functions, procedures and triggers to manipulate the data aids in maintain data integrity
and security (Powell & McCullough, 2007). The concern is using the correct function or
procedure within the development of the application. It is extremely important for
database developers and the application developers to have constant communication
regarding the design, development and implementation of thinclient technologies to
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avoid duplication of effort, maintain consistency in design, and the reuse of code for
expediency (McGovern et al., 2004).
Dependent on technology in place there are times where a duplication of security
features occur such as:
1. Using key certificates to access the application and the database
2. Using Key Fobs and Smart cards to access the application and the database
3. User ID and Password verification to access the application and the database
(Riedl, 2008)
While this duplication may go unnoticed by the enduser, validation passes
between the technology, the application and the database. The application and the
database should each have a user access schema with user role and group permissions.
The server and the application audit logs note user access times.
The application audit logs should contain more than just the user’s access. The
purpose of the audit logs is to trail every action that a user takes while working within the
application. The audit logs can be an excellent troubleshooting tool for application errors
however, more significantly, they serve as a record for any attempted security breach as
well as a record of a security breach. By reviewing the audit logs and noting how security
failed, developers can then correct the hole within the application security (Swanson &
Guttman, 1996/2008).
4.3 – Summary of Security Implementation
Securing data within the thinclient environment is a combined effort of the
database and application developers and the systems technology personnel (McGovern et
al., 2004). While there may be overlapping security features such as user ID and
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password for access at server, the application and the database there are security features
that have no need for overlapping or require duplication. The most important part of
security design is consistency of design, for doing so eliminates the possibilities of
security holes, security misinterpretation, and user access conflicts (Christensen,
Schneider, Thayer, & Winters, 2001/2003). Thus if encryption is used at the medical
SQL database level or database table field level, then there is no need for encryption at
the application level.
While there may be reasons to have user, role, and group restrictive views within
both the database and the application, proper design of database views allows the
application developers to call the views by name and reduce the risk of code disclosure.
This premise also holds true for database procedures, functions, and triggers (Meier et al.,
2003). On the other hand, application developer’s use of alias table name and table field
insure that the code does not disclose any pertinent information on the database. This is
important within the thinclient environment due to exposure through the Web interface
and the ingenuity of those with malicious intent (Watson et al., 2005). Anyone gaining
intimate knowledge through malicious activity of the application, the database or both
presents an immediate concern for data security and integrity (Britton & Bye, 2004).
Restricting users by limiting field character length, denying special characters,
and forcing data selection for data field entry guard against SQL injection and malicious
code entry and protect data integrity. While these restrictions are at both the database and
application level it is beneficial to be consistent with designing techniques to eliminate
confusion over the life cycle of the database and the application during future changes
(McGovern et al., 2004). Restricting user access session times to work hours aides in
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eliminating intrusions during off hours and through audit logs alert DBA’s, and IT
personnel of an attempted breach using a users login ID and password (Watson et al.,
2005).
The creation of SQL audit logs, SQL audit tables, and application audit logs are
important security features and an IS industry and medical industry best practice. The
audit logs and tables are a valuable source for noting security breaches and attempted
security breaches and assist developers in shoring up both the database and application
security against the malicious activity (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008).
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Chapter 5 – Lessons Learned and Next Evolution of the Project
The similarities in designing security for a medical SQL database and a
middleware application became very apparent quickly within the researched
documentation. The question then became, when would using one security design within
the medical SQL database or middleware application be better within the overall design?
My conclusion is that it more important to be consistent within the security design and
have a documented security design. Thus, if using AES at the medical SQL database
level would then require the use of AES with all medical SQL databases where data
encryption is a requirement. The reasons that consistency is so important, is over the life
cycle of the SQL database and its middleware application is that:
1. Consistency in security design makes changes, updates and revision easier by
knowing the security pattern and thus aides in maintaining security integrity.
2.

Consistency in design makes it easier for unit testing by following the security
chain through the SQL database, its middleware application and server interface.

3. Consistency in design makes it easier to troubleshoot, and to shore up a security
design in the event of a breach.
Communication
Because the SOX and HIPAA regulations and the need to maintain data integrity
and confidentiality forces the designers, developers and engineers to review every data
process taking place within the IS, and to document and evaluate security operations on a
regular basis. This also means that the DBA’s, designers, developers and system
engineers have excellent and open communication among themselves. The security
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design is too important not to have an understanding between all parties responsible for
the security of confidential information. Without proper communication between security
development teams, a change within the database, the application, or at the server level
can break the security chain throughout the IS.
System Documentation and Audit Logs
Audit logs and audit tables are extremely important to the successful security
design. In the event of a breach of security, following the audit logs and tables enables
the designers, developers and engineers to focus directly on the area where security failed
to meet the SOX and HIPAA requirements and the organizations security requirements.
While not within the realm of this study, that use of external third party security
programs and utilities are items for consideration, and evaluation for use. Often
developers attempt to reinvent rather then to use a documented and useful solution is
already in existence (Fowler, 2003). This is an area for further investigation and
interpretation in security design.
Testing and Evaluation
As with database design and application design, an important aspect of security
design is the on going evaluation and testing of the security features. Security design also
has a life cycle that includes updates and revisions as needs change through database and
application updates and revisions. While not a part of this study, it would be interesting to
investigate testing methodologies.
Summary
The five lessons learned are the need for consistency of design, open
communication with all responsible security personnel, excellent ongoing
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documentation through logs and audit tables, an understand the life cycle of the security
design and the regular testing of security features. While there is cross over between
database and application security design it is important for every organization to review
what is currently in place, what is working well or what should be improved upon, and to
determine what features are best utilized within the database opposed to use within the
application.
Within the thinclient environment, it is extremely important to know the table
and field structure of the SQL medical database, how each piece of data relates to the
SOX and HIPAA rules and regulations, and to the business rules of the organization for
planning security. Knowing the database structure and the value of the data as it relates
to regulatory compliancy, makes it easier to evaluate user roles and groups for the
security design of database and application access, user views, database and application
procedures, functions and triggers. Due to the exposure to the World Wide Web
(WWW) and the probability of malicious activities, that the methodologies discussed
may not be enough to protect data and the use thirdparty security utilities are a
consideration.
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Appendix A
SarbanesOxley Act Section 302

This section is of course listed under Title III of the act, and pertains to 'Corporate
Responsibility for Financial Reports'.
Summary of Section 302

Periodic statutory financial reports are to include certifications that:

• The signing officers have reviewed the report
• The report does not contain any material untrue statements or material omission
or be considered misleading
• The financial statements and related information fairly present the financial
condition and the results in all material respects
• The signing officers are responsible for internal controls and have evaluated
these internal controls within the previous ninety days and have reported on their
findings
• A list of all deficiencies in the internal controls and information on any fraud
that involves employees who are involved with internal activities
• Any significant changes in internal controls or related factors that could have a
negative impact on the internal controls
Organizations may not attempt to avoid these requirements by reincorporating their
activities or transferring their activities outside of the United States
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Appendix B
Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities
Chapter Six
Confidentiality of Health Information

Statement of the Right Consumers have the right to communicate with health care
providers in confidence and to have the confidentiality of their individually
identifiable health care information protected. Consumers also have the right to
review and copy their own medical records and request amendments to their
records.

In order to ensure this right:

•

With very few exceptions, individually identifiable health care information can be
used without written consent for health purposes only, including the provision of
health care, payment for services, peer review, health promotion, disease
management, and quality assurance.

•

In addition, disclosure of individually identifiable health care information without
written consent should be permitted in very limited circumstances where there is a
clear legal basis for doing so. Such reasons include: medical or health care
research for which an institutional review board has determined anonymous
records will not suffice, investigation of health care fraud, and public health
reporting.
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•

To the maximum feasible extent in all situations, nonidentifiable health care
information should be used unless the individual has consented to the disclosure
of individually identifiable information. When disclosure is required, no greater
amount of information should be disclosed than is necessary to achieve the
specific purpose of the disclosure.

Rationale

The legal right to confidentiality of health care information and its essential role in the
delivery of quality health care has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
lower Federal and State courts, and Federal and State lawmakers. Similarly, a health care
provider's obligation to protect the confidentiality of health information is universally
recognized. The assurance that consumers' health information will remain confidential is
"fundamental to effective diagnosis, treatment and healing" (Shalala, 1997).

At the same time, the quality of the health care system also depends on the regular
exchange of information between providers, employers, plans, public health authorities,
researchers, and other users. The changing structure of the health care system and rapid
advances in information technology and medical and health care research have increased
the demand for and supply of health information among traditional users such as the
treating physician, and new users, such as large networks of providers, information
management companies, quality and utilization review committees, and independently
contracted service providers. Concerns have been raised that, under the current system of
information exchange, various entities can access individually identifiable information
without sufficient security safeguards and consent requirements.
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Other activities undertaken to improve quality and efficiency may present new risks to
the confidentiality of health information. For example, quality oversight activities by
plans, providers, accreditation bodies, and regulatory agencies require detailed
information about the treatment and benefit status of individual consumers. The growing
role of employers in workforce health issues has also contributed to the confidentiality
debate.

Congress has made repeated attempts to enact a comprehensive Federal confidentiality
law but has, to date, been unsuccessful. The web of protections at the Federal and State
level that has evolved in the absence of a comprehensive law leaves many aspects of
health information unevenly protected. Specialized Federal protections already exist
through statutes that address substance abuse, Medicaid beneficiaries, public health,
research, government records, and those living with disabilities.

Several States have enacted comprehensive laws and an effort is currently under way at
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to draft a Protected Health
Information Model Act for States. Other safeguards have evolved outside of the
legislative arena. Accreditation bodies have incorporated requirements for confidentiality
policies and patient consent (JCAHO 1996; NCQA 1997; URAC 1996) and continue to
collaborate on security and confidentiality issues (JCAHO/NCQA Joint Session, 1997).

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) required the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit to the Congress detailed
recommendations on: (1) the rights that an individual who is a subject of individually
identifiable information should have; (2) the procedures that should be established for the
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exercise of such rights; and (3) the uses and disclosures of such information that should
be authorized or required (Public Law 104191). On September 11, Health and Human
Services Secretary Donna Shalala presented those proposals to the Congress (Shalala,
1997). Under the terms of HIPAA, if Congress fails to enact Federal confidentiality
legislation by August 1999, the Secretary of HHS is required to promulgate regulations
setting confidentiality standards.

The Secretary recommends a comprehensive Federal confidentiality law that would apply
"floor preemption," meaning that the law would require that all States comply with a
minimum set of confidentiality requirements but would not preempt stronger State laws.

Section 262 of HIPAA also requires the Secretary of HHS to adopt standards by
February 1998 for electronic transmission of financial and administrative health care
transactions (including information about claims, eligibility, payment, and injury), unique
health identifiers (for individuals, employers, plans, and providers), and security.

The Commission believes that it is essential to establish a comprehensive confidentiality
framework and encourages the Congress to move forward expeditiously.

Implications of the Right

•

Health plans, health providers, employers, and other group purchasers
should examine existing confidentiality protections to safeguard against improper
use or release of individually identifiable information. The Commission does not
intend to impede employers or providers from complying with duties established
by law. Health providers, facilities, and plans should develop procedures to ensure
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that when sensitive services (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, reproductive
services, or treatment of sexually transmitted diseases) are involved, standard
administrative techniques do not inadvertently disclose information to individuals
other than the patient. This is not intended to create two standards of
nondisclosure  one for sensitive medical conditions and another for all others. It
is merely a recognition that there may be high level concern about confidentiality
with certain medical conditions by some patients.

Law enforcement officers, researchers, and public health agencies should
examine their existing policies to ensure that they access individually identifiable
information only when absolutely necessary and provide proper safeguards to
assure confidentiality.

Consumers should become more aware of the content of their health records and
pay particular attention to requests by providers, plans, employers, or others to
gain access to those records.

URAC National Network Accreditation Standards (April 1996).
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88

Melissa WinnerLeoni Thesis 2008
Retrieved August 27, 2008, from Microsoft Web site: http://msdn.microsoft.com/
enus/library/ms994921.aspx
The authors of this article cover some very common sense type of security
measure for shoring up information presented on a Web server with thin client access.
The authors also explain vulnerabilities, and countermeasures with a means of improving
the user experience without jeopardizing security.

Monroe, R., Kompanek, A., Melton, R., & Garland, D. (2003). Architectural styles,
design patterns, and objects. software engineering, 1, 241.
The authors discuss software architectural styles, design patters, and objects
however, they do not advocate one approach over another. This is an excellent resource
for obtaining generalized information on IEEE approved software methodologies.

Padilla, R. (2005). Don't gamble with HIPAA security compliance. Retrieved August 2,
2008, from Techrepublic Web site: http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100
10878_115760663.htmlpart=rss&tag=feed&subj=tr
Padilla discusses the problems with meeting HIPAA regulations and electronic
employee connectivity and activity. Padilla explains the chances some institutions are
taking by not being fully HIPAA compliant.

Powell, G., & McCullough, C. (2007). Oricle 10g database administrator
implementation & administration. Boston: Thomson Course Technology.
(Original work published 2007)
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Powell and McCullough explain Oracle 10g database administration from the
implementation of a database through its life cycle. An excellent source for
administration of an Oracle database, the users, data security, troubleshooting and Oracle
features.

Praities, N., & Anekwe, L. (2008, February 6). BMA brands mental health law 'unethical.
Pulsenews, p. 10.
The author’s are reporting on the British Medial Association (BMA) decision to
have all mental health patients information placed into a national database. The author’s
note that one of the main reasons by physicians to resist a national database is the concern
that information within database not being adequately secured. The author’s state
statistics that 9 out of 10 doctors believe that patient’s records will be at risk if placed
into a national depository.

Riedl, B. (2008). Pseudonymization for improving the privacy in eHealth applications.
In B. Riedl, V. Grascher, S. Fenz., & T. Neubauer (Eds.), Proceedings of the 41st
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences  2008 (pp. 110). Vienna:
IEEE.
The author’s describe Pseudonymization; a technique where identification data is
transformed, and replaced by a specifier that cannot be associated with the identification
data without knowing a certain secret. The author’s describe the good points of
Pseudonymization and the bad points by explaining the consequences. However, the
author’s find Pseudonymization to be a more secure and expedient means to secure data
rather than data encryption which when applied to healthcare graphics such as
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mammograms can be inefficient and timeconsuming. The author’s also describe in
detail the formulas and definition of system attributes for Pseudonymization.

Sausner, R. (2008). Keeping your DBA honest. Banking Technology News, Unknown, 1.
While this article relates to the banking industry, Sausner references the medical
industry and the ability of DBA’s to cover their tracks while snooping on celebrities
medical files. This is an excellent article where Sausner discusses the use of audit logs
and tracking user access in conjunction with electronic signature software that notes
breaks in audit logs.

Schach, S. (2007). Objectoriented & classical software engineering (7th ed.). New
York: McGrawHill.
In this book, Schachs discusses the best practices within the software
development life cycle. Schach goes into detail on the Agile Methodology of software
engineering through the software process, working in teams, testing and cohesion. Often
he reflects on the classical software engineering process compared to OOP software
engineering, and contrasting the differences.

Shepherd, M., Zitner, D., & Watters, C. (2000). Medical portals: webbased access to
medical information. In M. Shepherd, D. Zitner, & C. Watters (Eds.),
Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 
2000 (pp. 110). Halifax, Canada: IEEE.
The author’s investigate the 3Tier based Portal for Webbased access to medical
information. The author’s model the process and show the complexity of security
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required within the architecture. The author’s define the pull, push and update process of
sending and receiving data. The author’s also describe the needs for data from the
physician’s role and the CEO’s role. The references are excellent and a good choice for
secondary research such as: Computerbased Patient Record Institute, Health Level 7 and
the National Library of Medicine.

Singhal, A. (2007). Guide to secure web services. In Computer security subcategory, web
services (NIST Special Publication 80095). Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. Department
of Commerce. Retrieved June 1, 2008, from U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Institute of Standards and Technology Web site:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/80095/SP80095.pdf
Singhal describes and covers NIST guidelines for securing Web services. Section
5 is concerned with legacy software’s, databases, and their security. Section 5 also covers
HIPAA policy as set forth in 80066Rev1/Draft_SP80066Rev1.pdf references

Smid, M. (2001). Announcing the advanced encryption standard. Springfield, VA:
National Institute of Systems Technology. (NTIS No. PB197) Retrieved August
21, 2008, from National Institute of Systems Technology Web site: http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips197.pdf
Smid covers the use of AES as the new standard in encryption offering
information on the history and evolution of encryption. Smid explains how AES became
the standard and depicts how the functionality algorithm works.
Swanson, M., & Guttman, B. (2008). Generally accepted principles and practices for
securing information technology systems. . (Original work published 1996)
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Retrieved August 2, 2008, from National Institute of Standards and Technology
Web site: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/80014/80014.pdfWatson, K.,
The authors wrote this document as a standard supported by the NIST covering
security of information and technology systems. Audit logs are covered in Chapter 3
beginning on page 50 offering a wealth of information on what audit logs should contain,
how they are to be constructed and the advantage of not just creating and having them,
but regular review of the information they contain.

The advisory commission on consumer protection, & quality in the health care industry.
(1999). Chapter 6: Confidentiality of Health Information. In consumer bill of
rights and responsibilities (pp. 1618).. Retrieved July 19, 2008, from opm.gov
Web site: http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/cbrr.htm#chpt6
This is the official government Web site on HIPAA rules and regulations.
Chapter 6 is on the laws that govern health care information. The requirements and the
exceptions are discussed in detail.

Watson, K., Nagel, C., Pedersen, H., Reid, J., Skinner, M., & White, E. (2005).
Beginning visual C# 2005 (K. Mohr, T. Dinse, T. Meister, A. Smith, M.
Wakefield, R. Swadley, et al, Ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, Inc.
The authors of this book instruct in writing Visual C# script within the .Net
framework and more specifically Visual Studio 2005. Chapter 18 covers basic Web
programming while chapter 23 explains XML use within a published application. The
authors warn against using XML for any object that needs security. The authors cover in
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detail deploying Web application in chapter 21 and discuss data access is detail within
chapter 22.

Woody, B. (2007). SQL server security (Version 1) [Computer software and manual].
Retrieved from http://www.informit.com/guides/
content.aspx?g=sqlserver&seqNum=245>
Woody discusses and depicts SQL for Encrypting sensitive data and offering
information on algorithms for asymmetric certification and keys. Woody also offers the
warnings of how locking yourself out of your own data becomes easy, thus encryptions
should not be entered into without planning.
W3C. (2008). http://www.w3.org/Security/ (W3C security home). Cambridge, MA:
Author.
This is the official web site of the W3C accepted best security practices. Also
presented is additional information regarding what the W3C is meeting and working on
security standards but have not yet incorporated into the W3C standards.
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Glossary
AES

Advance Encryption Standard

Banner Grabbing

Connecting to remote applications and observing the output.

Blended Threat

A blended threat is a sophisticated attack that bundles some of the
worst aspects of viruses, worms, Trojan horses and malicious code
into one threat.
British Medical Association

BMA
Buffer Overflows
CRUD

Occurs when a program or process tries to store more data in
temporary data storage then it was intended to hold.
Create, Read, Update, Delete

DES

Data Encryption Standard

Fob or Key Fob

HIPAA

A hardware device that randomly generates an access code that
changes every 30 to 60 seconds. Combines with a PIN number the
fob generated code gives access to another computer.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

HTML

HyperText Markup Language

HTTP

HyperText Transfer Protocol – a communications protocol for the
transfer of information on the Internet.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IEEE
Kerberos
IS

Kerberos is a protocol designed to enable two parties to exchange
private information across an open network.
Information Systems

IT

Information Technology

NetBios

To gain information about the resources available on a host or
network.

Enumeration
NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

OITS

Orissa Information Technology Society

OOP

Object Oriented Programming
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PL/SQL

Program Language/Structured Query Language

MVC

Model View Controller

PAC

Picture Archive and Communication Systems

PIN

Personal Identification Number

Ping Sweeps

Network scanning technique used to determine which of a range of
IP addresses map to live computers.
Public Key Infrastructure

PKI
Port Scans

SOX

A series of messages sent by someone attempting to break into a
computer to learn which computer network services, each
associated with a wellknown port number, the computer provides.
SarbanesOxley

SQL

Structured Query Language

SQL Injection

SQL Injections is a technique that exploits a security vulnerability
occurring in the database layer of an application by inserting a
query into a data field.
Secure Socket Layer

SSL
SYN Flood

TSQL
XML

An attack that sends TCP connections request faster than a
machine can process them causing the port to remain open and
blocks authorized user(s) access.
Transact Structured Query Language
Extensible Markup Language

W3C

World Wide Web Consortium

WWW

World Wide Web
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